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ARE EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKETS SUFFICIENTLY FLEXIBLE
TO COPE WITH EMU?
Whether European labour markets are sufficiently flexible to adjust efficiently to adverse
shocks and thus avoid a rise in unemployment has been hotly debated for a couple of decades.
Many studies have argued that European labour markets were less flexible that labour markets
in other OECD countries. As a result of those rigidities, it was argued, the rate of employment
corresponding to a given rate of inflation (the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of
Unemployment or NAIRU) was uncomfortably high in most EC member states.
Whereas most studies have been based on  indirect measures of flexibility, Rudy Douven of
the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Analysis (CPB) has attempted to directly measure the
responsiveness to shocks of five EU member states, the EU as a whole, the US and the
OECD. In a paper published as an ENEPRI Working Paper, Douven, presents calculations of
four indicators for labour market performance: flexibility, defined as the responsiveness of
wages to change in unemployment, the equilibrium rate of unemployment, and the variability
and persistence of this equilibrium rate.
Using an augmented Phillips curve in which the long-run equilibrium rate of unemployment
is independent of the rate of inflation (the long-run Phillips curve is vertical), Douven
calibrates the model for the OECD, the US, the EU, Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom
and the Netherlands. He finds, in particular, that in the four EMU countries (G, FR, I, NL), for
almost two decades nominal wage growth was lower than the sum of core inflation and
structural labour productivity growth. However, this wage moderation has not been sufficient
to restore equilibrium in the labour market.
Combining the four indicators, Douven finds that the UK is a special case with a relatively
high equilibrium rate of unemployment and strong flexibility. France and Italy, on the
contrary, combine relatively low equilibrium rate of unemployment with strong persistence
(hysterisis) and low flexibility. Germany and the US appear to be in a more balanced position
with about average equilibrium rate of unemployment and “appropriate” flexibility. The
Netherlands appears to be in a particularly favourable position with the actual unemployment
rate close to the long-term equilibrium and a flexible labour market. However, as stressed by
Douven, this may be due to a particular definition of unemployment. Using a broader
definition of unemployment, including “hidden” unemployment might give results more in
line with the other countries.
All in all, however, Douven argues that core inflation rates and labour productivity growth
tend to converge and that future wage setting in Europe will depend more and more on labour
market characteristics.
Jorgen Mortensen
CEPS Associate Senior Research Fellow and Manager of ENEPRIEQUILIBRIUM RATES AND WAGE FLEXIBILITY
IN EUROPE
ENEPRI WORKING PAPER NO. 10
R.C.M.H. DOUVEN
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ABSTRACT
his paper presents estimates of short-term and long-term equilibrium rates of
unemployment. Estimates of equilibrium rates of unemployment in the literature often
produce results that closely follow actual unemployment rates. This paper, in contrast,
shows that in the past twenty years equilibrium rates may well have been substantially lower
than actual unemployment rates in many European countries. This result indicates a
considerable period of rather low wage flexibility and strong persistence.
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Equilibrium Rates and Wage Flexibility in Europe
R.C.M.H. Douven
1.  Introduction
With the introduction of the euro national authorities in the European Union will lose some
potential macroeconomic policy options to accommodate shocks. To accommodate the impact
of shocks in the event of asymmetric disturbances, more flexibility will be needed on product
and labour markets, an important element here being macroeconomic wage flexibility.
1
Of course labour markets differ across countries. Any labour market is surrounded by an array
of institutional arrangements that forms a complex web of incentives and disincentives on
both sides of the market (Siebert, 1997). At the start of EMU it is interesting to study how
labour markets in EMU may behave and how this behaviour compares with that of labour
markets outside EMU. It is often argued that labour markets in Europe are rigid and
inflexible, while labour markets in the US are dynamic and flexible. Although there seems to
be an element of truth in this simple view the subject clearly calls for a more profound
approach (see e.g. Nickell, 1997).
In this study we will characterise a labour market by four indicators. The first one is
flexibility. Flexibility is defined as the responsiveness of wages to a change in unemployment
under a fixed institutional setting. Since flexibility may depend on the particular institutional
setting, we assume that institutions on the labour market are reflected in the long-term
equilibrium rate of unemployment. Institutions change, and so we allow for the possibility
that the equilibrium rate moves (slowly) over time. From this equilibrium rate we derive two
more indicators: its average level and its variability. A fourth indicator is persistence. In a
situation in which the equilibrium rate is low and flexibility is moderate, actual
unemployment may still be high due to persistence.
We will construct these four indicators for labour markets in France, (West) Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, the UK and the European Union as a whole, together with one country
outside Europe, i.e. the US. Furthermore, we consider the OECD as a whole. We will perform
our estimations using a similar functional form, comparable yearly data and a similar period
of estimation (1977-1998) for all countries. The analytic tool we use is the augmented Phillips
                                                
1 For a recent overview, see Buti and Sapir (1998).RCMH DOUVEN
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curve, with special emphasis on modelling the evolution of the equilibrium rate of
unemployment.
A considerable amount of research has already gone into calculating equilibrium rates of
unemployment. In addition to the structural approach,
2 we can distinguish in the literature the
approach that circumvents the problem of explaining the determinants of the equilibrium rate
of unemployment. If the (long-term) equilibrium rate is viewed as “ground out” by the
microeconomic structure and behaviour of the economy, then it should shift slowly (see
Gordon (1997)). Therefore, smoothness restrictions are often imposed on a function, only
depending on time, representing the (long-term) equilibrium rate of unemployment. In the
recent literature (see e.g. Cross et al. (1997), Debelle and Laxton (1997), Gordon (1997), IMF
(1998) and Staiger et al. (1996,1997)) this method is mostly applied to estimate the
NAW(I)RU (non-accelerating wage (inflation) rate of unemployment).
3 In this study we will
follow a similar strategy.
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. The first contribution is reflected in the particular
choice of the wage equation. Time-varying equilibrium rates are calculated from a wage
equation in which inflation and trend productivity growth are fully passed along into wage
growth. This strategy deviates only slightly from the above-mentioned NAW(I)RU studies,
but it may have considerable consequences for the positioning of the equilibrium rates.
4 The
second contribution is the explicit distinction between a time-varying long- and short-term
equilibrium rate. The time-varying short-term equilibrium rate is split up into two parts.
5 The
first part represents the time-varying long-term equilibrium rate and the second part represents
elements of persistence. Both aspects are directly related to institutional characteristics of the
labour market. It is still controversial whether elements of persistence play a role in the
                                                
2 This avenue of research took off after the publication of Layard et al. (1991). Many economic, but
also social and demographic reasons may explain the evolution of the equilibrium rate of
unemployment. The empirical literature points at the tax-wedge, user costs of capital, productivity
growth and all other types of labour market variables (replacement rate, unemployment benefits,
union-related indicators etc.) as possible determinants (see e.g. Ball (1997), Nickell (1998), Tyrvainen
(1994), and for the Netherlands, Broer et al. (1998)). Whether or not tax variables are important
determinants is still controversial. For example, Blanchard and Katz (1997) find little evidence for tax
variables.
3 Note, furthermore, that in our view the short-term equilibrium rate of unemployment and the  short-
term NAW(I)RU are model-dependent phenomena, whereas the long-term equilibrium rate and long-
term NAW(I)RU are equal. Thus, if there is no persistence all types of equilibrium rates are equal.
4 The concept is more in line with a study of Blanchard (1998), who considers a direct relationship
between the labour income share and the actual unemployment rate.
5 For a similar strategy, see Layard et al. (1991).EQUILIBRIUM RATES AND WAGE FLEXIBILITY IN EUROPE
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equilibrium rate of unemployment. In a recent study Ball (1997) regresses the equilibrium rate
on elements of persistence and on other labour market characteristics. His study points to
evidence that is consistent with theories of hysteresis.
The paper is organised as follows. In the second section we present the underlying model. The
third section presents the underlying theory and explains certain choices. In the fourth section
we present the estimation results and derive the four indicators from our model. The fifth
section compares our estimates of the short-term equilibrium rate with NAW(I)RU estimates
from the literature. Section six concludes.
2.  The model
Our starting point for estimation is a textbook version of an augmented Phillips curve (see e.g.
Burda and Wyplosz (1993)):
w = B 
c + h 
s  - " ( u - ul
*) -  $ )u +  ,   (1)
This equation posits that the percentage change in the nominal wage rate w depends on four
forces: the core (or underlying) inflation rate B 
c, the growth in structural labour productivity
h
s, the deviation of the actual unemployment rate u from the long-term equilibrium rate, ul
*,
and the change in the unemployment rate )u. Furthermore, a random error ,  is added. The
adjustment parameter " and persistent parameter $ are assumed to be constant and positive.
The underlying assumption of the model is that wages are determined by bargaining between
employers and workers (or their unions). It is assumed that the homogeneity condition for
prices and labour productivity holds. In the long run, i.e. a situation in which the growth in
real wages equals the growth in labour productivity and in which the unemployment rate is
constant, this guarantees that the Phillips curve is vertical and that unemployment equals its
equilibrium rate ul
*. After rewriting, the model reads as follows:
w - B 
c - h 
s  - (" + $)( u - us
* ) +  ,,   (2)
with   us
* := 
b + a
a  ul
* + 
b + a
b u(-1)
After moving B
c + h
s to the left-hand side, we obtain a new dependent variable: wage growth
minus core inflation minus structural labour productivity growth. Deviations from zero from
this variable correspond with deviations from the actual unemployment rate from its short-
term equilibrium rate u s
* which is represented on the right-hand side. The short-term
equilibrium rate represents a weighted average of the constant long-term equilibrium rate ul
*RCMH DOUVEN
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and the lagged actual unemployment rate u(-1). Persistence is strong if $ is large relative to ".
In that case  us
* is closer to u(-1) than to  ul
* and the economy behaves as if its equilibrium is
close to last period’s actual rate. If $ = 0, no persistence is present and the long- and short-
term equilibrium rate coincide. It may also be the case that no long-term equilibrium exists
("=0) and only elements of persistence play a role. In that particular case we speak of
hysteresis. Persistence can be explained by the erosion of human skills from prolonged
unemployment or from insider-outsider mechanisms. The latter refer to situations in which
persons holding jobs tend to safeguard their own employment in wage negotiations and thus
prevent the degree of (real) wage adjustment that would be required to make the employment
of job-seekers more attractive.
6 Note that equation (2) only slightly differs from the more
standard NAW(I)RU specification. That our particular choice may have considerable
consequences for the positioning of the (short-term) equilibrium rates is explained in
Appendix A.
The underlying model exhibits the following rules of thumb:
• The long-term equilibrium rate ul
* is the rate to which the unemployment rate tends in the
long run.
• The short-term equilibrium rate us
* is the level of unemployment that is consistent with a
stable pattern of wage growth (minus core inflation plus labour productivity growth) in the
short run.
• Generally, a long/short-term equilibrium rate under/above the actual unemployment rate
represents disinflationary/inflationary pressures on wage growth (minus core inflation, plus
labour productivity growth) in the long/short run.
7
• A strongly fluctuating long-term equilibrium rate u l
* indicates flexible labour market
institutions.
8 After estimating  ul
*, u s
*,  " and  $ we will construct the following four
indicators:
                                                
6 For a more general overview on these subjects, see Layard et al.(1991), Bean (1994) or McMorrow
(1996).
7 It may be possible that us
* lies above the actual rate and ul
* under the actual rate of unemployment.
This may be the case after a fast decrease of actual unemployment. In the short run we may then
observe inflationary pressures, whereas in the longer run these pressures are more likely to become
disinflationary.
8 Note that this implication is only one way! We can draw no conclusions from a constant equilibrium
rate of unemployment. It may also be very flexible.EQUILIBRIUM RATES AND WAGE FLEXIBILITY IN EUROPE
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1) Flexibility. Flexibility refers to the responsiveness of wage growth after increasing
unemployment  by 1% point, keeping structural labour productivity growth and core
inflation fixed.
2) Persistence. As follows from our exposition above, persistence is measured by: 
b + a
b
3) Average level of the long-term equilibrium rate ul
* during the estimation period.
4) Standard deviation of the long-term equilibrium rate  ul
* .
The estimation part of the model is not straightforward, since the parameters ", $ and the
time-varying parameter ul
* are likely to be interrelated. Furthermore, these parameters may
depend on the particular choice of core inflation and structural labour productivity growth. In
order to estimate equation (2), we have to make certain choices in advance. They will be
discussed in the next section.
3. Theory and choices
3.1 Why do we assume a time-varying long-term equilibrium rate, ul
*, while leaving
structural adjustment parameters, such as " " and $ $, constant?
One of the main problems in estimation is that the impact of a certain labour market policy is
often related to other complementary policies and institutions (see e.g. Coe and Snower
(1997)). An institutional change is therefore difficult to capture by a change in one single
parameter. More parameters are likely to change simultaneously. Although many studies
assume time-varying parameters, most research is directed only towards time-varying (short-
term) equilibrium rates of unemployment. A lot of research has been undertaken representing
NAIRUs with Kalman filters or spline functions. Examples are Cross et al. (1997), Debelle
and Laxton (1997), Gordon (1997) and Staiger et al. (1996, 1997). There is also a structural
empirical study, Ielegems and Plasmans (1998), which assumes changing persistence- or
adjustment parameters. Our own research in this field, using Kalman filters or polynomial
functional forms to describe the time-varying parameters, yielded indeed that most gains in
terms of fit were obtained by time-varying (short-term) equilibrium rates of unemployment,
and then subsequently by time-varying "’s. The lowest gains were obtained by time-varying
$’s. This research also indicated a strong positive correlation between  "+$ and  us
*. In
general, the smaller the distance between the estimated (short-term) equilibrium rate and theRCMH DOUVEN
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actual unemployment rate, the higher the estimated values for  "+$ that are found.
9 A
summary of this research is presented in Appendix B.
3.2 Representation of the long-term equilibrium rate of unemployment
According to Friedman’s (1968) interpretation: the long-term equilibrium rate is “grounded
out” by the set of “Walrasian” microeconomic relations in the economy, including the
structure and institutions of product and labour markets. In that case the long-term
equilibrium rate should shift slowly (Gordon (1997)). This aspect will be represented by a
smoothness restriction.
10 Using a smooth time-varying equilibrium rate may complicate
identification. To see this, consider the following simple model:
w = B 
c + (h 
s  - " ( u - u*) + ,,  with  0<(<1  (3)
where h 
s is a smoothed version of actual labour productivity. Because u* and h 
s are now
both smooth variables, identifying ( will not be possible.
11 Thus, if one imposes a smoothness
restriction on the equilibrium rate, then this has immediate consequences for (; we have to
predetermine (. The most natural choice now is to assume that (=1, which resembles the fact
that in labour-market equilibrium real wage growth equals structural labour productivity
growth.
The class of smooth functions is still extremely large and not well defined. First of all, we
experimented with polynomials and Kalman filter techniques to calculate the long-term
equilibrium rate. Each of these approaches has its own specific problems.
12 These
experiments were useful for obtaining ideas of defining a more compact class of functions.
Finally, to provide an example, we decided to substitute (and estimate) the following class of
asymmetrical density functions for the long-term equilibrium rate of unemployment:
                                                
9 This should be kept in mind. If estimates indicate an increasing equilibrium rate below the actual
unemployment rate, then this could also reflect a situation of a constant equilibrium rate with the
adjustment parameters decreasing.
10 Technically this aspect is also very appealing, since otherwise equation (1) would not be identified.
11 To understand this aspect, rewrite the equation as follows: w = B 
c - " ( u - ( u*+ (/" h 
s)) + ,. One
immediately observes that if u* and h 
s are both smooth then the ‘new equilibrium rate’: u *’= u* +
(/"  h 
s is again smooth; it is thus not possible to distinguish properly between the original model (4)
and the model: w = B 
c- "( u - u*’ )+,.
12 Polynomials are restricted in the sense that the shape of the curve towards a possible maximum is
always concave. Kalman filters have difficulties in explaining smooth jumps and can be very sensitive
to starting values and the smoothness parameters, which have to be determined exogenously. This
problem marks also the difference between research of US and European unemployment figures. SinceEQUILIBRIUM RATES AND WAGE FLEXIBILITY IN EUROPE
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ul
* :=(T -(L LT (1 - e
-(
l 
(t - T )2
 ) - (R RT (1 - e 
-(
r 
(t - T )2
 )                (4)
t    time
T    possible point of time where top of the function occurs
LT    dummy equal to 1 till T , afterwards 0
RT    dummy equal to 0 till T , afterwards 1
(T, (L, (l, (R, (r  characteristic parameters of asymmetrical function
A convenient way to visualise this equation is as follows. Consider two normal density
functions with different mean and variance. Cut both functions at their mean. Paste now at the
top, the left part of the first density function against (the top of) the right part of the second
density function. What is left over can be called an asymmetrical density function.
13 Note that
this function may contain only one top or trough.
14
3.3 Unemployment enters in a logarithmic form
Recently, a lot of attention has been directed towards linearity of the wage equation (see e.g.
Coe (1985), Debelle and Laxton (1997), Nickell (1998) or IMF (1998)). Experiments with
non-linear functional forms can be summarised by the following general class:
w  = B
c +  h
s  - f (ul
*, u, u(-1), ", $)    (5)
where f represents a non-linear function. This is a huge class of possible functions that may
complicate matters considerably. For example, the speed of adjustment may become
dependent upon the level of the equilibrium rate, shocks may work asymmetrically and we
may have to distinguish between different types of equilibrium rates, such as deterministic
and stochastic ones (see Debelle and Laxton (1997)). The current stance in the empirical
literature seems to be that some form of non-linearity exists. What exact type of non-linearity,
however, is still unclear. According to Nickell (1997) there are good theoretical and empirical
reasons for believing that downward pressure on wages is a concave function of the
                                                                                                                                                        
unemployment shows much more variabilty in the European countries than in the US, Kalman filters
seem to be less useful.
13 Of course, all the standard properties of a density function vanish. The function can also become
constant or simply an increasing function of time over the reference period if the top is outside this
period.
14 From a general viewpoint this is of course not necessary. However, Kalman filter experiments and
experiments with polynomials showed that this approximation worked reasonably well for all
countries.RCMH DOUVEN
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unemployment rate. Our empirical experiments with logarithmic functions did not reject this
observation and led to the conclusion that logarithmic functional forms for unemployment
performed on average somewhat better than linear functional forms.
15
3.4  The choice of the explanatory variables
For example, if the labour income share tends to return to a certain level, we may as well have
to include such a (level) error-correction specification into the equation.
16 The correct choice
for core inflation and structural labour productivity growth is also not entirely clear. Some
researchers claim that labour productivity is not fully transmitted into the wage rate (see e.g.
McMorrow (1996) or Tyrvainen (1994)). Another example is the choice of only one lag of
unemployment. It may well be the case that more lags are needed to describe the correct
impact of hysteresis (see e.g. Akram (1998)).
We assume that core inflation, B
c , is a function of lagged inflation, where inflation is re-
presented as a weighted average of lagged GDP-price inflation  By   and consumer price
inflation Bc  in the following way:
B
c = , By(-tp ) + (1-,) Bc(-tp ) (6)
This choice reflects the idea that, during bargaining, employers are mainly concerned about
production prices, whereas employees prefer to bargain on the basis of consumer prices.
Furthermore, wage contracts are negotiated for a given period of time. This choice is reflected
in tp.
17 The “optimal” share, , , and the “optimal” lag year, tp, are determined by calibration
(see Appendix C).
Structural labour productivity growth is a smoothed version of actual labour productivity. The
smoothness aspect reflects the idea that productivity gains accrue only little by little into
wages and are not a feature of the short-run. The smoothed version is obtained as follows:
h
s = 8 h
s (-1) + (1-8) h (7)
                                                
15 We also estimated the optimal lag in unemployment and represented )u in (1) by a distributed lag.
Technically, we substituted for )u in (1), (where in this example u is taken with a lag of -0.75): )log u
(-0.75)+...+ )log u (-0.75-(k-1)), where k varies by country and can obtain a maximum value of 3  (see
Appendix C).
16 For a discussion on this theme, see e.g. Blanchard and Katz (1997) or Fair (1997).
17 The latter choice corresponds with a wage contract of length 2 tp. If we assume that the observed
wage rate corresponds with the wage received at the middle of the contract with length 2 tp; then
inflation at the time of bargaining is lagged tp (see also Appendix C).EQUILIBRIUM RATES AND WAGE FLEXIBILITY IN EUROPE
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In this formula, h is actual labour productivity growth and 8 is a smoothness parameter. The
higher 8 is, the smoother structural labour productivity growth will be.
18
The previous discussion already contains one important message. Uncertainties surrounding
the equilibrium rate of unemployment are likely to be considerable and will depend on the
model selected. Considering the elusiveness of the concept, this is not so surprising and it
seems already generally accepted (see e.g. Staiger et al. (1996, 1997)). Although our model
fits the data well, we refrain from constructing uncertainty intervals around our estimates,
since our model is a particular result of the choices made.
4. Estimation results
This section will discuss the main results and show how these results are related to the
explanatory variables. The estimation results are extensively explained in Appendix C. First,
we present in Figures 1a and 1b some sub-graphs of the (estimated) explanatory variables.
The estimated values of core inflation show a decreasing converging pattern towards a value
around 2% in 1998. We also observe a gradual slowdown of structural labour productivity
growth in all countries.
19 A different picture emerges if we take a look at the third sub-graph,
the actual unemployment rates. The picture for the unemployment rates looks exactly the
opposite. The figure starts off in 1977 with unemployment rates between 4 and 6%.
Henceforth, unemployment rates diverge, featuring an M-shape. The initial increase in
unemployment is followed by a slowdown at the end of the eighties. At the beginning of the
nineties, however, unemployment starts to increase again; for some countries the slowdown
has not set in yet.
20 The fourth sub-graph shows the dependent variable in equation (2), called
cclis (core change in labour income share) in the sequel, and represents nominal wage growth
minus core inflation plus structural labour productivity growth ( cclis = w-B 
c-h 
s).
21 In
                                                
18  Again, calibration yielded smoothness parameters between 0.55-0.95. To calculate structural labour
productivity growth, we also need a starting value. For this value we used for each country the average
labour productivity growth of 1960-1975. For the exact values, see Appendix C.
19 The exact reason for the slowdown is still unclear. In part, it is probably still due to the oilshock in
1973 (see e.g. Perron, (1989)). The sub-graphs also show the “catching up” idea towards the
productivity levels of the US (see e.g. Wolff (1996)) Other possible explanations in the Netherlands
are the increase of the number of less productive workers (Pomp (1998)), or the productivity
slowdown in commercial services (Van der Wiel (1998)).
20  Remarkable is the fact that the two countries with the highest inflation rates in 1977, France and
Italy, show up as the ones with the highest unemployment rates in 1998. This suggests that these two
countries paid a high price in terms of unemployment to achieve convergence in inflation.
21 The variable cclis reflects the core change in the labour income share. If the labour market is in
equilibrium, i.e. a situation in which u equals us* (= ul*) and in which there are no exogenous shocksRCMH DOUVEN
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equilibrium it would be expected that this variable coincides with the zero-line, which is also
drawn in the sub-graphs. A remarkable pattern, however, emerges. We observe that cclis is
negative during (almost) the whole period for the four EMU-countries, the EU and the OECD.
Therefore, we expect the actual unemployment rates to exceed the short-term and long-term
equilibrium rates of unemployment. Exceptions to this rule are the UK and the US. Both show
an oscillating pattern around zero for  cclis. For example, for the UK, periods of
disinflationary wage pressures, such as 1981-1984 and 1991-1996 alternate with periods of
inflationary wage pressures, such as in 1985-1990 and 1997-1998. This indicates that actual
UK and US unemployment rates will oscillate around their equilibrium rates.
4.1  Long- and short-term equilibrium rates of unemployment
After estimation of the long-term equilibrium rate, we calculate the short-term equilibrium
rate.
22 Both are, together with the actual unemployment rates for each country, presented in
Figure 2. Both equilibrium rates give some interesting information.
As expected, the equilibrium rate patterns in Figure 2 differ among countries. The fact that
actual unemployment exceeds the short- and long-term equilibrium rate over the reference
period is in accordance with our expectations, given the negative cclis figures in the past
twenty years. The UK and the US are the major exception to the rule. Rather low long-term
equilibrium rates are found for the Netherlands and (West) Germany. Slightly higher rates are
found for France and Italy. For Italy and the US, best results are obtained with a constant
long-term equilibrium rate. In Italy, the short-term equilibrium rate lies closer to the actual
rate than to the long-term equilibrium rate. This suggests that in Italy it will take a lot of time
to bring unemployment back to the long-term equilibrium rate without providing inflationary
pressures. In (West) Germany, the UK and the Netherlands the equilibrium rate increased,
particularly during the first half of the eighties, but gradually declined thereafter, suggesting
that after an initial worsening the labour-market situation improved again. For Germany and
the Netherlands this is directly related to the peak values of cclis around 1988 in Figures 1a
and 1b, sub-graph 4. For France, the equilibrium rates remained low for a long time but the
                                                                                                                                                        
working on the economy, then we expect that the wage bargaining outcome will be such that nominal
wage growth equals core inflation plus structural labour productivity growth; hence cclis = 0. This
variable is not similar to the change in labour income share, since core inflation is not fully determined
by actual GDP inflation and structural labour productivity is not equal to actual labour productivity.
Actual labour income shares, however, also show a clear downward trending pattern in some large
countries in Continental Europe  (see e.g. Blanchard (1998)).
22 The short-term rates are calculated in a similar way to the calculations performed in equation (2).EQUILIBRIUM RATES AND WAGE FLEXIBILITY IN EUROPE
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rise, starting at the end of the eighties, does not yet seem to have stopped. Direct estimations
for the EU as a whole show an intermediate pattern for the equilibrium rate: a rise during the
first half of the eighties and a stabilisation around 6% from 1988 onwards.
Despite the well-known aggregation problems of the European Union data, the long- and
short-term equilibrium rate of the European Union seems reasonably well to reflect the
average of the long- and short-term rates of its member countries. (West) Germany, France,
Italy and the Netherlands all have lower long-term equilibrium rates, but this is compensated
by higher long-term equilibrium rates of the UK and, presumably, by countries like Spain and
Portugal (although these are not investigated in this paper).121314EQUILIBRIUM RATES AND WAGE FLEXIBILITY IN EUROPE
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4.2 Indicators for the labour market
 In this subsection we construct from the estimated model four simple indicators for the
labour market.
1) Persistence
Persistence implies that once unemployment has risen it cannot be brought back quickly to the
long-term equilibrium rate without a rising wage (cclis) rate. In our (non-linear) model it
corresponds also with the fact that extra unemployment has a smaller effect on wages when
unemployment is already high (compared to a tighter labour market). We use a simple
measure for persistence: $/("+$). Table 1 presents the results obtained from our estimations.
We found strong persistence in France and Italy. This will cause serious problems when it
comes to reducing unemployment. In general, the presence of persistence makes it easier, in
terms of (wage) inflation, to raise unemployment and harder to reduce it. For example, in the
UK and the US persistence is also relevant, but persistence makes it easier, in terms of wage
inflation, to restore labour-market equilibrium in times where unemployment is below the
long-term equilibrium rate of unemployment (see e.g. Layard et.al. (1991)).
Table 1. Persistence
OECD US EU WGE FR IT UK NL
Persistence indicator* 0.44 0.64 0.56 0.45 0.70 0.92 0.69 0.48
*  High values imply strong persistence.
2) Flexibility
Flexibility measures the responsiveness of wages with respect to an increase in actual
unemployment. We measure this by the response on wages after a 1% exogenous increase in
actual unemployment, leaving core inflation and structural labour productivity unchanged
during the whole sample period. The average wage responses are presented in Table 2. We
observe low flexibility in Italy and France, which suggests that in both countries the situation
on the labour market is less taken into account in the wage-setting process.
Table 2. Flexibility
OECD US EU WGE FR IT UK NL
Flexibility of
wages*
-0.32 -0.16 -0.28 -0.22 -0.05 -0.03 -0.24 -0.30
* Low absolute values imply rigid labour markets.
Similar results follow from the following fictitious experiment, in which we consider a
simultaneous system by adding, for each country, a simple unemployment equation to theRCMH DOUVEN
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augmented Phillips curve. This gives us the opportunity to analyse the adjustment process of
unemployment after an exogenous shock in unemployment. In order to perform this
experiment, we used the following relationship for explaining unemployment:
ln (u) =ln(u(-1)) + 0.3 *{0.5*cclis(-1)+0.3*cclis(-2)+0.2*cclis(-3)} + shock (8)
The unemployment equation describes unemployment as a function of lagged unemployment
and a distributed lag of cclis.
23 For example, if wages rise – by constant core inflation and
structural labour productivity – then unemployment increases. After combining equation (7)
with our wage equation, we are able to perform our fictitious experiment. We raised shock in
equation (7) by one percentage point in the first year. The outcomes with respect to
unemployment are presented for the eight countries in Figure 3. We observe responses similar
to Table 2. The Netherlands performs best and absorbs a one percentage point exogenous
increase in unemployment by almost 90% in ten years. The results in the Netherlands are
partly due to its good economic performance during the last four years. The results for the
OECD are more difficult to explain. This may partly be due to data-aggregation problems.
                                                
23  All coefficients are calibrated. For the Netherlands, the values roughly correspond with other
studies at CPB and fit reasonably well. This does not necessarily have to apply to other countries. For
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Figure 3: Response of unemployment after a 1-year increase of
unemployment with 1% point, using a fictitious unemployment equationEQUILIBRIUM RATES AND WAGE FLEXIBILITY IN EUROPE
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3) Variability of long-term equilibrium rates
A strongly fluctuating long-term equilibrium rate indicates flexible institutions. In Table 3 we
therefore present the standard deviations of the long-term equilibrium rates. Note that this is
an imperfect measure. First of all, the measure does not distinguish between “positive” and
“negative” flexibility. Second, negative and positive effects may have cancelled out. This may
be the case in the US or Italy, where our estimations resulted in a constant long-term
equilibrium rate of unemployment. Yet a noteworthy result using this measure is therefore the
strong variability in the UK.
Table 3. Standard deviations of long-term equilibrium rates (1977-1998)
OECD US EU WGE FR IT UK NL
Standard deviation long-
term equilibrium rate
0.8% - 1.2% 1.0% 1.1% - 2.4% 0.9%
4) Average level of long-term equilibrium rates
Table 4 presents the average values of the equilibrium rate of unemployment. Note, again, the
high value for the UK. The UK seems to combine a relatively high equilibrium rate of
unemployment with great flexibility. This is in contrast with France and Italy, for example,
which seem to combine relatively low long-term equilibrium rates with low flexibility.
Table 4. Average long-term equilibrium values (1977-1998)
OECD US EU WGE FR IT UK NL
Average long-term
equilibrium rate
5.1% 5.5% 5.1% 2.4% 3.1% 4.8% 8.0% 2.8%
Is it better to have a high equilibrium rate and much flexibility or a low equilibrium rate with
less flexibility? This question is difficult to answer, although it seems that the UK is situated
on one side of the spectrum and Italy and France on the other. The other countries show a
more balanced pattern. The Netherlands, however, seems to combine the best of both worlds
– with relatively high flexibility and a low long-term equilibrium rate of unemployment.
                                                                                                                                                        
the US in particular, the adjustment coefficient 0.3 is probably too low. In this paper, however, we
have concentrated only on differences in the wage equation.RCMH DOUVEN
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4.3 Will wage setting be moderate in the future?
The observation that in the four EMU countries the long-term equilibrium rate lies below the
actual rate of unemployment implies that moderate wage setting is still the rule. For the US,
the equilibrium rate in 1998 lies above its actual rate, indicating possible upward wage (cclis)
pressures. Also the long-term unemployment rate in the UK shows an oscillating movement
around the actual unemployment rate.
24
The situation in (West) Germany deserves special attention, as the gaps between actual
unemployment, on the one hand, and the long- and short-term equilibrium rates, on the other,
are rather large.
25 If the estimated equilibrium rates would prove correct and there would be
no sudden change in policy (for example to a demand-oriented policy), then very moderate
wage rises are expected in the years to come. The model forecasts a similar wage-setting
behaviour as in the past, which corresponds for 1999 with rather modest nominal wage rises
(of around 2%).
Unemployment in the Netherlands is currently close to its short- and long- term equilibrium.
In 1998 we observe for the first time a situation in which the long-term equilibrium rate lies
below the actual rate of unemployment and yet the short-term equilibrium rate lies above the
actual unemployment rate. The reason for this occurrence is the sharp decline in actual
unemployment in 1997 and 1998. In the short-term, therefore, our model forecasts
inflationary wage pressures of about 0.6% higher than the sum of structural labour
productivity growth and core inflation.
5. Results related to NAIRU estimates in the literature
The results of the short-term equilibrium rate of unemployment can, in principle, be compared
with the standard NA(W)IRU estimates in the literature, under the additional assumption that
expected wage inflation equals core inflation and structural labour productivity growth. To
see this, rewrite equation (2) as follows:
w - w 
e = -(á+â) ( u - us* ) + ,  (9)
                                                
24 This asymmetry could imply a future risk for EMU, if the UK would join. Some researchers also
point to a positive aspect. If labour markets’ business cycles are less synchronised, then international
risk-sharing of labour becomes possible. For the moment, however, labour mobility is rather low in
Europe.
25 The fact that in the past four years (West) Germany followed a policy of pronounced wage
moderation translates the model into a very low long-term equilibrium rate of unemployment.EQUILIBRIUM RATES AND WAGE FLEXIBILITY IN EUROPE
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with w 
e = ð 
c + h 
s. However, most of the literature simply assumes w 
e= w(-1), or some
distributed version of lagged values of wage growth. In that particular case, the estimated us*
is often called the NAWRU. As put forward in Appendix A, our particular choice yields that
for the European economies the short-term equilibrium rate us* is generally lower than the
NAWRU estimates from the literature. This finding is strongly related to the fact that cclis< 0
during the past two decades for the European economies. This contrasts the current literature
in which European NAWRU estimates fluctuate around the short-term equilibrium rate (see
e.g. Ball (1997), OECD (1994)). European NAWRU estimates fluctuating around the short-
term equilibrium rates are also found if the time-varying aspect of the NAWRU is only
allowed to depend on labour productivity growth (see McMorrow (1996)). Replacing w - w 
e
by its counterpart: inflation minus expected inflation, ð - ð
 e , does not really yield different
results (see e.g. Cross et al. (1997) or  IMF (1998)).
Since for the UK and the US cclis oscillates around zero, we do not find too much difference
between our short-term equilibrium rates and those for the NAW(I)RU, as mentioned in the
literature above. For example, our rates show a strong similarity with the NAIRU estimates in
IMF (1998). This observation is also in line with Gordon (1998), who argues that the well-
known stability of labour’s share in the US since the early 1970s suggests that wage
behaviour has not played much of an independent role in the inflation process.
We are not aware of any structural approach that results explicitly in estimates of short-term
and long-term equilibrium rates of unemployment. These structural approaches normally
result in determinants explaining a long-run relationship of unemployment. Since in these
approaches the long-term equilibrium rate depends often upon the chosen co-integrating
vector, uniqueness aspects play a much more important role than in single-equation exercises.
Also the choice of institutional variables that should enter into the specification of the short-
and long-term equilibrium rate becomes of major importance for the final results.
Our finding suggests that most labour markets in Continental Europe have been out of
equilibrium for about two decades. This observation suggests also that a pronounced period of
wage moderation has not led to a decrease in unemployment. There seems to be a very slow
adjustment towards the long-term equilibrium rate. We did not investigate the reason for this
finding in our paper, but Blanchard (1998) observes a similar result by relating labour income
shares with unemployment rates. He argues that, possibly, wage moderation has not led to a
decrease in unemployment because another type of shift has been at work, this time on theRCMH DOUVEN
20
labour demand side. At a given wage and a given capital stock, firms have steadily decreased
employment.
6. Conclusions
The fact that (core) inflation rates and (structural) productivity growth rates in Europe
converge among countries implies that differences in future wage setting will depend more
and more on differences in labour-market characteristics.
Our analysis, using an augmented Phillips curve, shows that for almost two decades in four
countries in continental Europe nominal wage growth was lower than the sum of core
inflation and structural labour productivity growth. This declining (trend) in the labour
income share corresponds with a long/short-term equilibrium rate that continuously falls
below the actual rate of unemployment. This finding is in contrast with NAW(I)RU estimates
from the recent literature.
The estimation results are quite robust against different specifications of the model. The most
important assumption for our result is that, on average, labour productivity gains are fully
passed along into wages
26.
The precise level of the long/short-term equilibrium rate, however, is surrounded with more
uncertainty. It is well known from the literature that equilibrium rates can be measured only
very imprecisely (see Staiger et. al. (1996, 1997)). In this paper we did not, therefore,
concentrate on uncertainty intervals of the equilibrium rates themselves, but rather
experimented with Kalman filters and polynomial type of functions to check for robustness.
As an example, we decided to represent in the underlying paper the long-term equilibrium
rates by asymmetrical density functions. This type of function performed reasonably well for
all countries during the years 1977 through 1998.
Our findings also suggest that in the past two decades wage moderation in four countries of
Continental Europe has not been sufficient to restore equilibrium on the labour markets. A
possible explanation for this phenomenon, which has not been investigated in this article, is
that the demand curve for labour has shifted. Blanchard (1998) gives two potential lines of
explanation. The first concerns shifts in the distribution of rents away from workers – for
example the elimination of chronic excess employment by firms. The second explanation
                                                
26 See footnote 10.EQUILIBRIUM RATES AND WAGE FLEXIBILITY IN EUROPE
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points to technological bias: firms in continental Europe are introducing technologies biased
against labour towards capital.
From the model we obtain some characteristics of the various labour markets, which are
presented by four indicators. These indicators are the average level of the long-term
equilibrium rate,  the variability of the long-term equilibrium rate, flexibility and persistence.
Combining these indicators, we conclude that on one side of the spectrum the UK is a special
case. It combines relatively high equilibrium rate with strong flexibility. On the other side of
the spectrum France and Italy combine relatively low long-term equilibrium rates of
unemployment with strong persistence and low flexibility. The trade-off patterns for (West)
Germany and the US seem to be more balanced.
The best performance seems to come from the Netherlands. The Netherlands succeeded not
only in bringing down the equilibrium rate of unemployment, but also succeeded in bringing
the actual unemployment rate closer to the long-term equilibrium rate. Partly this performance
is due to a strong institutional reform, which included lower replacement rates, lower taxes,
and more flexible labour and commodity markets. But partly it is also due to a favourable
definition of unemployment. Broadly defined unemployment, including hidden
unemployment, is much higher in the Netherlands than in many other countries and may well
exceed 20% (see also Bovenberg (1997)).RCMH DOUVEN
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Appendix A
The wage equation and the NAIRU specification: What’s the difference?
The NAIRU concept is related to the inflation rate and its simplest form can be stated as
follows:
B  = B 
e  - "  ( u - u * ) + ,,                                                                                               (a1)
In this equation  u* represents the NAIRU and  B
e expected inflation. Some researchers
estimate the unemployment rate consistent with stable wage inflation instead of price
inflation. In that case, some researchers call the corresponding  u * the NAWRU, or even
NAIWRU. Ball (1997) claims that there is no clear reason for focussing on wage inflation or
on price inflation. We specify the NAWRU equation as follows:
w = w 
e  - "  ( u - u * ) + , ,                                                                                              (a2)
If we now assume that  w 
e =  B 
c + h 
e, we are simply back in model (2) of our paper. Note,
however, that in NAW(I)RU papers this choice is not a common one; normally a lagged
version of wage inflation is considered for expected inflation ( B 
e  ),  or expected wage
inflation (w 
e ).
In the long run, the difference between the NAW(I)RU and our model (2) does not seem to
matter. If (wage) inflation is stable we simply have: u = u * . Similar arguments hold for the
wage model in our paper; if in the long run a stable nominal wage inflation equals a stable
inflation plus stable labour productivity growth, then:  w =  B 
c + h 
e and again u = u * . Since
the models (a1) and (a2) do not make an explicit distinction between the short run and the
long run, one should treat them as short-run models.
The short run can also explain the empirical differences between the models. Consider the
following example: assume that B 
c =B 
e , and compare the model:
w = B 
e + h 
s  - "  ( u - u * ) + , ,          (a3)
with the model in (a1). Now assume that model (a1) equals model (a3), i.e. assume similar
equilibrium rates and similar speed of adjustments " and similar errors ,. In that case, it would
also have to hold that growth in real wages follows structural labour productivity growth (w-B
= h 
s). This aspect, however, does not hold in the short run. For example, for countries in
Continental Europe the growth in real wages was often higher than structural labour
productivity growth. This empirical aspect translates the model in (a3) into equilibrium ratesEQUILIBRIUM RATES AND WAGE FLEXIBILITY IN EUROPE
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that are lower than actual unemployment. The key point is that, in principle, this reasoning
will hold without knowing the exact evolution of inflation, which in model (a1) may result in
equilibrium rates that oscillate around or are even higher than the actual rate of
unemployment.
As an example, consider France in Figure A1. For each of the three models we present the
dependent variables, after transferring the expectations terms to the left-hand side: in model
(a1): B - B 
e , in model (a2): w = w 
e, in model (a3):  w - B 
c - h 
s. For the expectations variable
in model (a1) and (a2), we simply take a one-year lagged value:  B 
e =  B(-1),  w 
e = w(-1), and
for model (a3) we simply take cclis as constructed in our paper. Figure A1 shows that cclis<0,
whereas this result does not hold for B - B(-1), and  w - w(-1) in model (a1) and (a2). As a
result, in model (a1) and (a2), u* is likely to follow more closely the actual unemployment
rates. Similar results are obtained if we perform this analysis for other countries.RCMH DOUVEN
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Appendix B
Estimation of time-varying " ", $ $, ( ( using Kalman filters and polynomials.
27
The starting point of our experiments concerned the following equation:
w=B
c + h
e - " (ln u(-1) - ln u*) - $ )ln u(-1) + ,,                                                       (b1)
The first experiments concerned testing the variability of each parameter,  ",  $, and  u*
independently, using a Kalman filter approach and a polynomial approach.
 1) A Kalman filter approach
For each parameter in question, we substituted a random walk model (the Kalman filter). We
distinguish the following three possibilities:
(A1): "t = "t-1 + ìt , with  $, ( constant.
                                                
27 Recently, a lot of research has aimed in this direction, using Kalman filters and also spline
functions. This research concentrated mainly on time-varying NAIRU’s. Examples are Cross, Darby
and Ireland (1997), Gordon (1997), Staiger, Stock and Watson (1996) and Debelle and Laxton (1997).
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(B1): $t = $t-1 + ìt , with ", ( constant.
(C1): ut* = ut-1* + ìt , with ", $ constant.
where we assume , ~N(0,ó,
2) and ìt ~N(0, óì
2).
The estimations concern always one time-varying parameter at a time. The other two
parameters will be considered constant and are freely estimated, except for the case (A1) and
(B1) where a fixed value for u* is calibrated. For this value we use the pre-knowledge that
during the sixties in all countries the long-term equilibrium rate is situated about ¾%-point
above the average level of unemployment (see also Appendix C). Since u* is assumed to be
constant, it should retain this value.  In the Kalman filter estimations the variance óì
2  is
calibrated to obtain a plausible goodness-of-fit statistic and to obtain a sufficiently smooth
time-varying parameter. Finally, ó,
2 is determined by the (EVIEWS) estimation programme.
2) A polynomial approach
In this section we substituted, instead of Kalman filters, polynomials. This involves
substitution of ", respectively, $, respectively, u* by a polynomial function. For example, in
the case of a time-varying " we substituted the following equation:
(A2):    "t  = Ó k=0 
k=n æk * time
k , with  $, u* constant.
Using a similar procedure, we substituted a time-varying $t (B2) and (t (C2). We estimate the
non-linear equation using a maximum likelihood method, under the assumption , ~N(0,ó,
2).
The degree of the polynomial ( n) is calibrated; only if a polynomial of a higher degree
performs substantially better (in terms of goodness-of-fit) will it be chosen; otherwise the
polynomial with the lowest degree is chosen. The other constant parameters are treated in a
similar fashion as discussed in the Kalman filter approach.
In Table B1 we present the most important results.
28  In the table we refer to Figure B1, where
nine graphs are shown for three regions: the Netherlands, the EU and the UK. In each graph
the time-varying parameter under estimation is shown, using a Kalman filter and a
polynomial. Note that in the case of polynomials, we found for u* only one top. Remark also
that the Kalman filter estimations are not particularly smooth.
Conclusions from this type of research can be summarised as follows.
                                                
28 More extensive estimation results are available upon request.RCMH DOUVEN
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1) The time-varying aspect of  $ (indicating persistence) contributes relatively little in
obtaining a higher goodness-of-fit statistic. The low Durbin-Watson statistics suggest,
furthermore, that the equation is mis-specified. Thus, it does not seem that we limit ourselves
too much by assuming them to be constant.
2) Time-varying "’s seem to explain a bit more. The relatively low assumed values for the
equilibrium rate of unemployment seem to result in rather low  "’s .The time-varying
trajectory of  " follows often a path inversely related to the time-varying trajectory of  u*,
suggesting a strong negative correlation between the two.
Table B1. Estimation results of the wage equation 1977-1997 (for the dependent variable, we
use wage growth minus core inflation and structural labour productivity growth)
Model R
2
DW " $ u*
Netherlands " Kalman filter (A1) 0.54 1.8 fig. 2.4 1.5*
"  polynomial   (A2) 0.51 1.8  fig. 1.3 1.5*
$ Kalman filter (B1) 0.33 1.4 1.0 fig. 1.5*
 $  polynomial   (B2) 0.31 0.8 0.9 fig. 1.5*
( Kalman filter (C1) 0.69 2.2 2.3 1.3 fig.
(  polynomial   (C2) 0.62 2.3 5.4 0.3 fig.
United Kingdom " Kalman filter (A1) 0.48 1.6 fig. 7.2 4.0*
"  polynomial   (A2) 0.59 1.4  fig. 4.8 4.0*
$ Kalman filter (B1) 0.45 1.6 0.6 fig. 4.0*
$  polynomial   (B2) 0.28 1.0 0.8  fig. 4.0*
( Kalman filter (C1) 0.84 2.3 5.0* 4.1 fig.
(  polynomial   (C2) 0.64 1.9 6.0 5.2  fig.
European Union " Kalman filter (A1) 0.81 1.8 fig. 5.9 3.0*
"  polynomial   (A2) 0.69 1.8  fig. 5.6 3.0*
$ Kalman filter (B1) 0.37 0.9 1.0 fig. 3.0*
$ polynomial   (B2) 0.26 0.9 1.0  fig. 3.0*
 ( Kalman filter (C1) 0.58 1.0 1.1 4.9 fig.
( polynomial   (C2) 0.86 2.4 7.8 2.5  fig.
* Parameter fixed.EQUILIBRIUM RATES AND WAGE FLEXIBILITY IN EUROPE
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Figure B1. Time-varying parameter estimates of " (ALPHA), $ (BETA) and u* (U*), for
three regions, using Kalman filters and polynomials.
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3) Time-varying equilibrium rates seem to contribute most toward improving the goodness-
of-fit. Our conclusion is that the time-varying aspect of this parameter is worth investigating
further. Remark that the long-term equilibrium rates tend to be higher than the expected
historical (constant) value (1.5% for the Netherlands, 4% for the UK and 3% for the EU). The
result of these higher values is that the speed of adjustment (") tends to increase and the
persistence parameter ( $) decreases. This shows once more the possibility of a strong
correlation between the three parameters.
4) These different estimations indicate already that there is a lot of uncertainty. In the case of
Kalman filters, this uncertainty depends on the starting values and the chosen variances of the
time dependent parameters.
The above mentioned conclusions seem to justify why we pay most attention in our research
to time-varying equilibrium rates of unemployment and why we leave " and $ constant. Of
course, most likely is the case that all parameters are time-varying and that there is even some
kind of underlying economic relationship among the parameters. We performed some
empirical research in this field, but mainly failed due to identification problems. In that
respect, the underlying research follows closely the empirical theory of the NAIRU, in which
similar choices are made.
29 If we accept that there exists a correlation between  the
equilibrium rate of unemployment and ", then the introduction of non-linear functional forms
becomes interesting.
30 In our research we deal in part with this aspect by choosing a
logarithmic specification.
                                                
29 References of this type of research are mentioned in the first footnote of this Appendix.
30 Using a non-linear specification may change the properties of the model substantially. For example,
shocks become dependent upon the level of the equilibrium rate of unemployment, the quantitative
response of negative and positive shocks differs, and we may distinguish between two types of
equilibrium rates: a deterministic and a stochastic one (see Debelle and Laxton (1997)).EQUILIBRIUM RATES AND WAGE FLEXIBILITY IN EUROPE
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Appendix C
Calibration and estimation results
We first repeat the characteristics of the model. The general model (see equation (1) in the
main text) can be described as follows (with the inclusion of logarithms):
w = B 
c + h 
s  - " ( log u - log u* ) -  $ ) u +  ,, (c1)
where we have made the following choices. Core inflation (B 
c ) is defined as follows:
B 
c = , py(-tp) - (1-,) pc(-tp), (c2)
where -tp  represents a lag (see also (c4)). Structural labour productivity growth ( h 
s ) is
defined as:
h
s = 8 h
s(-1) + (1-8) h (c3)
To calculate this value, a starting value is needed. For this value we took the average growth
of labour productivity during 1960-1975. In Table C1a this value is given under the column-
heading h
e
6075.
Unemployment enters with a lag. Thus, log u  in (1c) is replaced by log u(-tu), which is a
weighted average of actual and one-year lagged logarithmic unemployment:
log u(-tu) =(1- tu) log u + tu log u(-1) (c4)
The persistence term is modelled as follows:
)u = log u(-tu) -1/k Ó1
k log u(-tu -k)) (c5)
where k represents the number of lags. Finally, the equilibrium rate of unemployment enters
via an asymmetrical density function:
u
* :=(T -(L LT (1 - e
-(
l 
(t - T )2
 ) - (R RT (1 - e 
-(
r 
(t - T )2
 )  (c6)
where t represents time, T the possible point in time where the maximum of the function
occurs,  Lt  a dummy equal to 1 till T , afterwards 0, and Rt a dummy equal to 0 till T , and
afterwards 1. The remaining parameters characterise the shape of the density function.
We assume that all parameters in (c6) are positive.
31 If  t = T, then the second and third terms
on the right-hand side are equal to zero, and the long-term equilibrium rate u* reaches its
                                                
31 Experimentation yielded that the appearance of a trough was very unlikely in all countries. This
probably has to do with the low starting value for the equilibrium rate in 1977.RCMH DOUVEN
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maximum value (T . If t < T , the third term becomes zero and u* approaches (T-(L in the past.
The asymptomatic value of ( in the future is (T - (R . The function also generates equilibrium
values outside the estimation period. We used this fact by assuming that during the sixties in
all countries the equilibrium rate was about ¾ %-point higher than the average actual
unemployment rate (Table C1a represents this value under the column-heading  u*60). The
assumption that the equilibrium rate lies above the actual rate corresponds with the fact that
inflation rates and labour income shares increased slowly during that period. The exact value
(within certain limits), however, is of minor importance for the final estimation results. This
strategy restricts the starting value and reduces the number of parameters by one, leaving four
parameters to estimate. Simultaneous estimation of  (R and  (r   also yielded problems.
Therefore, we fixed (r on an identical value for all countries.
32 If u* contains a maximum, then
the year, indicated by T, indicates where the maximum takes place. The value for the year T is
obtained by trial and error, around the year suggested by the Kalman filter and polynomial
approach, with goodness-of-fit as maximisation criterion.
Substituting these choices in the model leaves us with the following seven parameters to
estimate: the lag value of the unemployment rate  tu , the smoothness parameter  8, the
adjustment parameter ", the persistence parameter $, and the three parameters determining
u*, namely (R, (L and (l. Note that our fitting procedure is a mixed process of calibration and
estimation. Compared to a standard linear estimation procedure the following aspects have to
be taken into consideration. First, fixing certain parameters in advance will hurt the correct
size of the t-statistics, which may results in biased uncertainty intervals. Second, the specific
choice of class for u* is obtained with pre-estimation. Considering these facts we will present
only goodness-of-fit statistics (R
2) and Durbin-Watson (DW) statistics in the tables.
In the estimations we transferred core inflation to the left-hand side and used, in the first
instance, w-B 
c as dependent variable.
33 A closer inspection of the residuals revealed that
negative and positive residuals still showed an alternating pattern, which apparently can not
be explained by changes in parameters or lag structures. Overshooting and undershooting of
the actual wage growth rates can, however, be explained economically. Firstly, concluding
wage contracts is not a continuous process of agreements, but more a yearly recurring
process. Second, expectations may play a role as well, in particular expectations concerning
                                                
32 Sensitivity analysis, within reasonable bounds, showed not too much variation in the final results.
33 Since after calibration B 
c is exogenous this transformation does not really matter for the outcomes.EQUILIBRIUM RATES AND WAGE FLEXIBILITY IN EUROPE
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inflation and unemployment. If these expectations do not prove to be correct, then often the
damaged party wants to be compensated, at least partially, in the next round. Third, wage
contracts are sometimes longer-lived than one year. For example, Buti and Sapir (1998) argue
that wage-contract inertia is higher in the US, where wage bargaining is less synchronised and
more staggered over time and wage contracts typically have a longer life (some three years)
than in the EU, where wage bargaining is more synchronised and coordinated and we observe
shorter-lived wage agreements (one to two years). Taking these aspects into account, we
decided that it seemed more sensible to replace the dependent variable by a smoothed version.
We used a three-year moving average. Technically, we replaced w-B 
c by :
w-B 
c = <1·(w(-1)-B 
c(-1))+<2·(w-B 
c)+<3··(w(+1)-B 
c(+1)),
where the weights <1,<2,<3 add up to one. The goodness-of-fit statistic (R
2 ) showed an
improved of about 10% in most cases. The parameter estimates, compared to the experiment
without averaging, however, did not change too much.
In Table C1a we present the calibrated values. These values are mostly obtained by a trial-
and-error process, using the R
2 of the final equation as maximisation criterion.
Substituting the calibrated values into the model, direct estimation becomes possible. The
result of these parameters is presented in Table C1b. To obtain a better interpretation of the
goodness-of-fit statistic and the Durbin-Watson statistics, we present in Figure C1 for each
country a graph with the actual and fitted dependent variable. Note that for Europe and Italy
the Durbin-Watson statistics are rather low. One should, however, not worry too much about
these values. A slightly more flexible functional form of u*, than used in this paper, would
probably be enough to solve these problems. In Table C1c we present some characteristics of
the long- and short-term equilibrium rate. In three subsequent columns we present its
estimated value in 1977, its estimated value at the year where it reaches its top, and its
estimated value in the final year 1998.RCMH DOUVEN
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Table C1a. Calibrated parameters wage equation, 1977-1998
, t p 8 h
e
6075 k u*60 (r year u*top <1 <2 <3
OECD 0.3 0.8 0.5 3.4 3 3.9 0 1988 ￿  ￿ ￿
US 0.5 0.8 0.8 1.6 3 5.5 - - ￿  ￿ ￿
Europe 0.5 0.3 0.9 4.0 1 3.0 0 1988 ¼ ½ ¼
W-Germany 0.8 0.8 0.8 4.0 1 1.5 0 1988 ￿  ￿  ￿ 
France 0.0 0.3 0.8 4.4 3 2.3 - 1998 ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Italy 0.8 0.3 0.6 5.2 2 4.8 - - ￿  ￿  ￿ 
UK 0.3 0.5 0.8 2.5 2 3.0 0 1985 ¼ ½ ¼
Netherlands
  0.5 0.8 0.9 4.0 3 1.5 0 1988 ¼ ½ ¼
Table C1b. Estimated parameters wage equation, 1977-1998, after substituting the
calibrated values in Table 1a.
R
2 DW " $ tu (T (L (R (l
OECD 0.93 2.07 2.32 1.8 0.69 5.88 2.03 0.06 0.05
US 0.81 1.74 1.06 1.82 0.50 5.50 - - -
Europe 0.98 1.29 2.54 4.68 0.42 8.54 4.39 0.29 0.02
W-Germany 0.92 1.96 1.18 0.96 0.69 4.47 2.97 3.04 0.08
France 0.89 1.68 1.11 2.53 0.85 5.25 3.00 - 0.02
Italy 0.82 1.02 0.88 10.1 0.09 4.75 - - -
UK 0.93 1.97 2.66 5.92 0.60 12.11 8.86 5.84 0.03
Netherlands
a 0.91 1.82 2.27 2.95 0.81 4.22 2.72 1.69 0.04
a We included a plus/minus-dummy for the years 1981-82, corresponding with wage measurements in 1981.RCMH DOUVEN
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Table C1c. Some characteristics of the long- and short-term equilibrium rate of
unemployment
u*1977 u*top u*1998 year top u*s 1977 u*s top u*s 1998
OECD 3.85 5.88 5.83 1988 3.81 6.55 6.58
US 5.50 5.50 5.50 - 6.50 - 5.37
Europe 3.05 6.19 6.00 1988 3.63 8.21 8.64
W-Germany 1.50 4.47 1.58 1988 2.17 5.09 3.09
France 2.25 5.19 5.19 1998 2.77 9.4 9.40
Italy 4.75 4.75 4.75 - 4.94 - 11.2
UK 3.99 12.11 6.32 1985 3.96 11.4 7.50
Netherlands 1.52 4.22 2.64 1988 1.99 6.28 4.40EQUILIBRIUM RATES AND WAGE FLEXIBILITY IN EUROPE
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